Robery Bradley, Joyce Bradley, R. Dale Whitlock, Louis Peterson, and Barbara Peterson v. Payson City Corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
Robery Bradley, Joyce Bradley, R. Dale Whitlock,
Louis Peterson, and Barbara Peterson v. Payson
City Corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jody K. Burnett; Williams & Hunt; David C. Tuckett; Payson City Attorney; attorneys for appellant.
Scott L. Wiggins, Mark E. Arnold; Diana L. Garrett; Arnold & Wiggins; attorneys for appellees.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bradley v. Payson City Corporation, No. 990329 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2145
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT BRADLEY JOYCE BRADLEY, 
T3 nATEWHTTLOCK, LOUIS 
S S i BARBARA PETERSON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
PAYSON CITY CORPORATION 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT PAYSON 
CITY 
CaseNo.990329-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
Scott L.Wiggins 
Mark E.Arnold 
Diana L. Garrett 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C 
American Plaza n , Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4333 
Facsimile: (801) 328-4351 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ Appellees 
Jody K Burnett (0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 364-4500 
David C. Tuckett (5812) 
PAYSON CITY ATTORNEY 
439 West Utah Avenue 
P.O. Box 421 
Payson,UT 84651 
Telephone: (801) 465-5234 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Payson City Corporation 'PW-C^-J 
Utah Court otADpeate 
OCT 1 3 BSS 
juttaD'Mesandro 
- -.. «i the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT BRADLEY, JOYCE BRADLEY, 
R. DALE WHLTLOCK, LOUIS 
PETERSON, and BARBARA PETERSON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
PAYSON CITY CORPORATION 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT PAYSON 
CITY 
Case No. 990329-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE RAYM. HARDING, SR., DISTRICT JUDGE 
Scott L. Wiggins 
Mark E. Arnold 
Diana L. Garrett 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4333 
Facsimile: (801) 328-4351 
Jody K Burnett (0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 364-4500 
David C. Tuckett (5812) 
PAYSON CITY ATTORNEY 
439 West Utah Avenue 
P.O. Box 421 
Payson, UT 84651 
Telephone: (801) 465-5234 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Payson City Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
IV 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
. . . . 1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES,
 2 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
2 
A NATURE OF THE CASE 3 
B' COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS ••
 4 
C STATEMENT OF FACTS 
7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
7 
ARGUMENT 
BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE S T A N D A ^ t ) 
REVIEW OF L E G I S L A ^ D E C i s r o ^ O l ^ ^ ^ 
%™^^(^™™™™...
 9 
ANN. $ 10-9-1001 
s THFPAYSONCrTY COUNCIL WAS CLEARLY ACTING 
A
- S ^ LEGISLATIVE CAPACTTY FN DENYING 
^ T L F F S ' REQUEST FOR REZONING 9 
.„, .^OTXITCTRATTVE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS 
B
- S S S THE BROAD JUDICIAL 
S F I S T O PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY 
^ORLfEDT^AMUNICIPALIITS LEGISLATIVE ^ 
DECISIONS 
i i 
C. THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD HAS 
A DIFFERENT MEANING WHEN APPLIED TO 
LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS 13 
n. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT STANDARD OF 
REVIEW, FAILED TO GRANT THE CUTS DECISIONS THE 
REQUISITE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OR JUDICIAL 
DEFERENCE AND IMPROPERLY SUBSTITUTED ITS JUDGxMENT 
FOR THAT OF THE CITY COUNCIL 17 
III. THE CUTS DENIAL OF BRADLEYS' REZONING REQUEST WAS 
NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL 19 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE CITY'S DENIAL OF BRADLEYS' REZONING 
REQUEST WAS BASED SOLELY ON CITIZEN 
OPPOSITION BECAUSE THE "PUBLIC CLAMOR" 
ANALYSIS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS 20 
B. THE EXISTENCE OF EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
WHICH MIGHT ALSO SUPPORT AN ALTERNATIVE 
CONCLUSION DOES NOT MAKE THE CUTS 
DECISION ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL 
22 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDUM 27 
i i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bd. of Comm'rs v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc., 652 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1982) . . . 21 
Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) 14 
C.R.P. Inv., Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 1981) 21 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257,1258 (Utah 1980) 10 
Certified Surety Group, Ltd. v. UT Inc., 960 P.2d 904 (Utah 1998) 1 
Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986) 14 
Chanhassen Estates Residence Assoc, v. Chankassen, 342 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 1984) . . 21 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 449 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1969) 12 
Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994) 20 
City of Barnum v. County of Carlton, 386 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. App. 1986) 21 
Cottonwood Heights Citizens Ass'n v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 
593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979) ' 12 
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 
(Utah 1976) 11, 15, 16 
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988) 14, 21 
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 17, 18 
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 
799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990) 14 
Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633, 635-36 (Utah 1961) 9, 12, 21, 22 
Heilman v. City of Roseburg, 591 P.2d 390, 394 (Or. App. 1979) 21, 23 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,1156 (Utah 1983) 9 
iv 
Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 398 P.2d 27 (Utah 1965) io, 16 
Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 
(Utah App. 1995) 14 
Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Sandy City, 879 P.2d 1379, 
1383 (Utah App. 1994) ' 15 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) 9, 15, 22 
Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988) 9 
Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 25 n. 6 
(Utah App. 1998) 9,11-13, 16 
Sparks v. Douglas County, 904 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1995) 17 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 
979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999) 10,17 
Walker v. Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993) 15 
Wells v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp., 936 P. 2d 1102 
(Utah App. 1997) 14 
Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) . . 14, 17, 18 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 2, 8, 9, 13-15 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-402 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403 20, 23 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
v 
r ^ r Authorities 
1 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning (4 ed. 1996) U 
1 Ziegler, Rathkopf s the Law of Zoning and Planning
 1Q 
(4 ed. 1989, supp 1998) 
3 Ziegler, Rathlcopfs the Law of Zoning and Planning 
4 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning (4 ed. 1996) 2 3 
5 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning (4 ed. 1996) 1 5 
V I 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) granting jurisdiction over cases transferred by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed reversable error by improperly substituting 
its judgment for that of the City Council and thereby failing to grant the statutory 
presumption of validity and judicial deference to which the City is entided in the exercise of 
its legislative discretion? 
Standard: A trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness with no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Certified Surety Group, Ltd. v. UT Inc., 
960 P.2d 904,905-06 (Utah 1998). Preserved: (R. 75-77, 250-51). 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by improperly applying the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review which is applicable to quasi-judicial or 
administradve land use decisions as opposed to the more deferential standard applicable to 
this quintessential exercise of legislative discretion by the City Council in furtherance of its 
zoning powers?1 
Standard: Same as No. 1 above. Preserved: (R. 75-77, 250-51). 
1
 We note that the issue of what is the appropriate standard for judicial review of a 
municipality's legislative land use decisions, posing nearly identical legal questions, is 
presented in an appeal pending before this Court in Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City. Case 
No. 981628-CA. As a result, much of this brief mirrors arguments made in briefing the 
Harmon City appeal. 
1 
3. Did the trial court err by improperly presuming that the City acted in 
response to "public clamor35 in denying the plaintiffs3 application for rezoning? 
Standard: Same as No. 1 above. Preserved: (R. 245-47). 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
A municipality's land use decisions in the exercise of legislative discretion are entided 
to a statutory presumption of validity which limits the scope of a trial court's review of 
those decisions. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative 
remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with 
the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
fa) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1001. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a land use case arising from the decision of the Payson City Council in the 
exercise of its legislative discretion to deny two applications for rezoning of the Appellees3 
(collectively "Bradleys") property (the "Property") from residential agricultural to high 
density residential use. The Property was zoned for the most part R-l-A which is a low 
density residential agricultural zoning with minimum lot size of one acre. One portion of 
2 
the property was zoned 1-1 industrial. In January of 1996, Bradleys applied to the City to 
have their property rezoned to R-2-75, a higher density multi-family zoning designation. 
The City's Planning Commission voted to recommend denial of the rezoning and the City 
Council subsequently denied the application. 
In March of 1996, Bradleys made another application for rezoning seeking to have 
the Property zoned R-l-9, a higher density single family zoning, which effectively 
superceded the earlier application. After a public hearing on the second application, the 
City Council voted to deny that second rezoning request. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Bradleys then initiated this lawsuit claiming that the City's denial of their rezoning 
request was arbitrary and capricious and that it constituted a taking of their property 
without compensation. On March 21, 1998, the City filed a motion for summary 
judgment arguing that, based upon the legislative record, the City had acted appropriately 
within its legislative discretion in evaluating and denying the rezoning request. Bradleys 
subsequently filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and opposed the City's motion, 
claiming that the decision by the City was arbitrary and capricious. 
By Memorandum Decision filed on January 22, 1999, the trial court ruled that the 
City Council's decision was arbitrary and capricious. It based its ruling on a finding that the 
reasons for the City's decision were (1) without sufficient factual basis and (2) based on 
citizen opposition. The court also indicated that it had reviewed the zoning maps and, 
substituting its judgment for the legislative discretion of the City Council, reached the 
3 
conclusion that there was no reason not to approve the rezoning. Ignoring the fact that the 
second application which triggered this legal challenge requested rezoning to the R-l-9 
designation, the trial court ordered that "the zone change from R-l-A to R-2-75 is hereby 
approved." The court's Order granting summary judgment was entered on March 16, 
1999. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Property at issue lies within an area zoned R-l-A, low density 
agricultural residential with one acre minimum lot size, or 1-1 industrial. (R. 70-71.) 
2. The R-l-A zone is abutted on four sides by property zoned for industrial use. 
(R. 42-43.) 
3. The 1995 Payson City General Plan encourages residential areas to be located 
east of the 1-15 buffer and establishes as a long-term goal and policy the enactment of 
zoning ordinances utilizing the natural buffer of 1-15 and providing for the 1-1 industrial 
zoning designation in areas west of 1-15. The General Plan further encourages the 
concentration of 1-1 industrial zoning in the natural commercial corridor between the 
Union Pacific and D&RW rail lines and Interstate exists #254 and #252. (R. 50, 52.) 
4. In January of 1996, David S. White applied to Payson City for rezoning of 
property owned by Dale H. Tanner, Lewis J. Peterson and R. Dale Whitelock from R-l-A 
zoning to R-2-75, a high density multifamily residential zoning (the ccWhite rezoning53). 
(R. 177-78.) 
5. In a report to the Planning Commission, the planning staff recommended 
that the Commission recommend to the City Council approval of the White rezoning. (R. 
173.) 
6. The request came before the Planning Commission on February 6, 1996. At 
that time, Mr. White indicated his desire that the area involved be rezoned to provide rental 
housing within the City. Mr. Whitelock, one of the property owners represented by 
Mr. White, indicated that the area was no longer suitable for him to raise bobcats, so he had 
to relocate and was in favor of the rezoning. Commissioner Tutde expressed the concern 
that many who had moved into the area had done so to have one acre lots. Chairman 
Stewart expressed concern that the general plan anticipated industrial development in the 
surrounding areas. The Commission voted to recommend scheduling of a public hearing 
for the request. (R. 62-3, 166-67.) 
7. The public hearing on the rezoning request was held March 20, 1996, before 
the Planning Commission. The Commission received a petition signed by 38 property 
owners in the area affected by the rezoning request opposing the White rezoning and 
stating a preference that the area remain zoned R-l-A. (R. 159-60) Although the majority 
of public comments opposed the White rezoning, either for preference for animal property, 
interest in maintaining the character of the area, or concerns over infrastructure, several 
comments were in favor of the rezoning. After the public discussion, the Commission 
recommended that the City Council deny the request to rezone the Property from R-l-A to 
R-2-75. (R. 59-60, 153-55.) 
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8. On March 20, 1996, in a City Council meeting following the Planning 
Commission meeting, a public hearing was held on the White rezoning application. In 
addition to public comments about retaining the current zoning for raising animals and 
preserving the nature of the neighborhood, other comments raised concerns about traffic 
levels in the area. There appeared to be sympathy with the need for low income housing, 
but the consensus on the Council appeared to be that this was not the right area for it. The 
Council voted to deny the White rezoning based upon the general plan, traffic concerns, 
and the Planning Commission recommendation. (R. 64-65). 
9. Prior to the City's denial of the White rezoning request, Louis J. Peterson 
filed a request to have the area encompassing his property and others rezoned from R-l-A 
to R-1-9 (the "Peterson rezoning5') on March 8, 1996.2 The reason given was "[t]he size of 
the lots are too large for the familys [sic] to handle/3 (R. 145.) 
10. The Planning Staff recommended to the Planning Commission that the 
Peterson rezoning be approved. (R. 140.) 
11. On April 11,1996, the Planning Commission first considered the Peterson 
rezoning. The Commission noted that the Gordon Taylor property was not properly 
included in the request because it was outside the City limits and no annexation request for 
the property had been received. It also noted that an additional property would be affected, 
the "Toleman property which is currently Industrial would become Residential.53 The 
2
 In their summary judgment memorandum, Bradleys stated that the application 
was also on behalf of R. Dale Whitelock, Robert Bradley, Gordon Taylor and Pete Schmidt 
to have their properties rezoned. The application does not indicate the names of these 
individuals, but the area to be rezoned includes property owned by them. 
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Commission voted to recommend approval of the Peterson rezoning and set it for public 
hearing subject to removal of the Gordon Taylor property from the request. (R. 122-23.) 
12. The Peterson rezoning came before the City Council for public hearing on 
May 22, 1996. Among the public comments were comments by representatives of 
businesses in the abutting industrial area including Associated Foods, indicating its concern 
that truck noise will cause residents to seek action against it, and Muir Roberts, worrying 
about whether residents would tolerate the noise and smell of its packing facilities. After 
closing the public hearing, the Council voted to deny the Peterson rezoning request. 
(R. 307-310.) 
13. Bradleys commenced this action by Verified Complaint dated March 26, 
1997, and filed April 1, 1997. (R. 1-16.) 
14. Pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment by the parties, the trial 
court entered a Memorandum Decision on January 22, 1999. (R. 341-43, copy enclosed at 
Addendum A-l.) 
15. The summary judgment Order was entered on March 16, 1999 (R. 344-345, 
copy enclosed as Addendum A-2) and the City's notice of appeal was filed on April 5, 1999. 
(R. 350-351.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal illustrates the confusion that exists with respect to the appropriate 
standard of judicial review of a municipality's legislative land use decisions vis-a-vis quasi-
judicial or administrative land use decisions. The difference is significant and implicates the 
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constitutional separation of powers doctrine as well as long-standing and well-established 
legal precedent granting substantial judicial deference to the exercise of legislative discretion 
by local decision makers. 
In this matter, the trial court incorrecdy applied the wrong standard by failing to 
grant the City's decision the presumption of validity and broad judicial deference to which it 
was entitled, and by making an independent decision substituting its judgment for that of 
the Payson City Council, the legislative body charged with the responsibility of making 
public policy choices, such as those posed by requests for zoning amendments. The denial 
of Bradleys3 rezoning requests was supported by the record as not being in harmony with 
the Payson City General Plan and was therefore not arbitrary, capricious or illegal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. 
This Court should prevent such an unwarranted interference with the political/ 
legislative process by the judiciary. This case presents an opportunity to clarify and reaffirm 
the appropriate standard of judicial review for such legislative decisions. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS AN IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS AS OPPOSED TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTIONS OF A MUNICIPALITY UNDER THE "ARBITRARY OR 
CAPRICIOUS" LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1001. 
A. THE PAYSON CITY COUNCIL WAS CLEARLY ACTING IN A 
LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST 
FOR REZONING. 
In addressing die issues presented here, it is important to recognize and keep in mind 
that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act. 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992). See also Scherbei v. Salt 
Lake City Corp.. 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988) ("the passage of general zoning 
ordinances and the determination of zoning policy [are] properly vested in the legislative 
branch."); Gavland v. Salt Lake County. 358 P.2d 633, 635-36 (Utah 1961) (zoning is a 
legislative funcuon carrying with it wide discretion). See also Smith Inv Co. v Sandy City. 
958 P.2d 245, 25 n. 6 (Utah App. 1998) ("die Supreme Court of Utah termed rezonings 
'administrative5 for purposes of holding them to be unfit subjects for referendum. For all 
other purposes, however, rezonings in Utah are characterized as legislative.") The Payson 
City Council was clearly acting in a legislative capacity when it reviewed and acted upon 
Bradleys3 rezoning applications. 
It is also important to understand that the legislative process is inherently political in 
nature and requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interests of all concerned in 
furtherance of the general welfare. Tenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1156 (Utah 1983) 
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("broad matters of a political nature are best determined in the legislative branch of 
government"). The legislative acts of zoning and planning affect the broad interests of all 
citizens in a municipality and have traditionally been granted substantial judicial deference 
based upon their subjective nature and the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. 
B. AN ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE BROAD JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
AND PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AFFORDED TO A 
MUNICIPALITY'S LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS. 
Legislative decisions of municipalities in the exercise of their zoning and police 
powers are reviewed by courts with considerable deference. Springville Citizens for a Better 
Community v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999) ("A municipality's land 
use decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference.33); 1 Ziegler, RathkopPs the Law of 
Zoning and Planning (4 ed. 1989, supp 1998) § 3.04[1] at 3-23 (cited herein as 
"RathkopPs"). The burden of overcoming this deference and presumption of validitv lies 
with the plaintiff who is making the challenge to the validity of the decision. RathkopPs 
§ 3.04[1] at 3-23. See also Call v. City of West Tordan. 614 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Utah 1980) 
(ordinance passed within the scope of legislatively granted power is accorded a presumption 
of constitutional validity); Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 398 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1965) 
("[W]e are more than cognizant of the proposition that the governing body of a city is 
endowed with considerable latitude in determining the proper uses of property within its 
confines.33) The Utah Supreme Court has traditionally granted municipalities'considerable 
discretion in their exercise of the legislative power to zone. 
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In the review of zoning cases the function of the court is narrow and 
its scope is limited to a determination of whether or not the action of 
the Board of County Commissioners as a legislative body is illegal, 
arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious. No contention is made that 
the county did not act within its grant of powers from the legislature 
in its adoption of the original zoning ordinance. The prior decisions 
of this court without exception have laid down the rule that the 
exercise of the zoning power is a legislative function to be exercised by 
the legislative bodies of the municipalities. The wisdom of the zoning 
plan, its necessity, the nature and boundaries of the district to be 
zoned are matters which lie solely within that discretion. It is the 
policy of this court as enunciated in its prior decisions that it will 
avoid substituting its judgment for that of the legislative body of the 
municipality. 
Crestview-Hoiladay Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co.. 545 P.2d 1150, 1151-52 
(Utah 1976) (emphasis added). 
The burden a plaintiff must bear in overcoming the presumption of validity is 
substantial. 
While the most common statement of the degree of proof required to 
overcome the presumption of validity is that the issue must be 
removed from the area of reasonable debate, the courts have used a 
variety of language to describe what all agree is an extraordinary 
burden. A number of courts require that the litigant asserting 
invalidity prove by "clear and convincing" evidence that the ordinance 
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or otherwise invalid. Some courts require 
"clear and 'affirmative53 evidence of invalidity, and others simply require 
that the invalidity be "clearly" shown or conclusively demonstrated. 
1 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning (4 ed. 1996) § 3.21 at 136-37 (referred to 
herein as "Anderson"). 
Where a presumption of validity has been given to zoning decisions, but the 
evidence in support of a decision is fairly debatable, the court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the body making the zoning decision. Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy 
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City. 958 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah App. 1998); 3 Ziegler § 42.07[2] at 42-54,55. This is 
clearly the position of Utah courts as apparent from this Court's recent review of the well-
reasoned line of authority cautioning against unwarranted judicial intrusion into municipal 
legislative functions. Smith Investment at 252-53. See also Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver 
County, 449 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1969) ("Whether we agree with the wisdom of the 
county commissioners or do not agree with it is of no importance. The matter is to be 
decided by a legislative body . . . and the courts do not ordinarily interfere in such 
matters."); Gayland at 636 (the fact that the evidence could have led to a contrary decision 
does not lead to the conclusion that the decision which was made is not supported by the 
evidence); Cottonwood Heights Citizens Ass'n v. Bd. of County Comm'rs. 593 P.2d 138, 
140 (Utah 1979) (courts should not interfere with land use decisions "unless it is shown 
that there is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken."); Smith Investment at 952-53 
(selection of one of alternative methods of solving a problem is entirely within city's 
discretion). 
Applying the appropriate standard of review in this case would require that Bradleys 
affirmatively overcome the presumption of validity afforded the City's denial of their 
rezoning applications. It is not sufficient that they simply disagree with the outcome or can 
point to indicia that the decision could have gone either way. They must clearly 
demonstrate that the evidence leads only to the conclusion that the City's actions were 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. As noted in Gayland, supra, if there is another possible 
reasonable outcome, the Court must defer to the City's legislative discretion. Bradleys did 
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not satisfy this burden. The legislative record, including references in the General Plan 
anticipating industrial zoning for this area of the City, supports the action of the City 
Council and demonstrates that their decisions were not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. The 
trial court therefore improperly interfered with the City's legislative discretion and its 
decision should be reversed. 
C. THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD HAS A 
DIFFERENT MEANING WHEN APPLIED TO LEGISLATIVE 
DECISIONS. 
There appears to be some confusion among trial judges and practitioners as to 
whether the standard of review set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 for determining 
whether the actions of municipality are arbitrary, capricious or illegal applies to all 
municipal land use decisions regardless of whether the nature of decision at issue is 
categorized as "legislative," "administrative53 or "quasi-judicial."3 Utah courts have long 
recognized a clear and meaningful distinction, both statutory and judicial, between the 
discretion afforded to administrative or quasi-judicial decisions of local governmental 
entities as opposed to legislative actions, in recognition of the constitutional separation of 
powers doctrine. 
There is no real conflict between the "reasonably debatable" standard of review for 
legislative decisions articulated by this Court in the Smith Investment opinion when 
analyzed in the context of the arbitrary and capricious language of Utah Code Ann. 
3
 Even the City in its opening memorandum prepared prior to this Court's Smith 
Investment decision focused on the "substantial evidence" standard. In later memoranda 
and at oral argument, the City focused on the "fairly debatable" or "reasonably debatable" 
standard enunciated by this Court in Smith Investment. 
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§ 10-9-1001. In point of fact, those positions are easily reconciled by a recognition of the 
fundamental distinction between the character of administrative or quasi-judicial decisions 
as opposed to legislative actions. 
It is apparent from its Memorandum Decision (R. 341-343) that the trial court 
improperly relied on the "substantial evidence55 standard to determine whether the decisions 
to deny Bradleys5 rezoning requests were arbitrary or capricious. That standard, however, 
comes from case law which addresses administrative land use decisions and does not apply 
to fundamentally legislative decisions. Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment. 957 P.2d 
207 (Utah App. 1998) (city's administrative interpretation of its zoning ordinances); Wells 
v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp.. 936 P.2d 1102 (Utah App. 1997) (board of 
adjustment decision denying variance); Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City. 685 
P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) (same); Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 
602 (Utah App. 1995) (review of trial court's finding of arbitrary and capricious action by 
county in approving special exception to zoning ordinance); Davis County v. Clearfield 
City. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988) (denial of conditional use permit); First Nat3! Bank 
of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County. 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990) 
(administrative evaluation of property for tax purposes); Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 
P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986) (administrative procedures for processing variance requests). 
The bulk of these cases address decisions of boards of adjustment. The distinction 
between the quasi-judicial decisions of a board of adjustment as opposed to legislative 
municipal zoning decisions is significant. To begin with, boards of adjustment have no 
14 
legislative authority and are not permitted to exercise those powers. E.g., Salt Lake County 
Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Sandy City, 879 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Utah App. 1994) 
(improper to delegate legislative function to board); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 
P.2d 212, 220 (Utah 1992) ("Boards of adjustment can tailor a zoning or rezoning 
ordinance to specific, unforeseen circumstances, but they lack the authority to determine 
zoning classifications of their own accord.") See also 5 Young, Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning (4 ed. 1996) § 21.04 at 699 (referred to herein as "Anderson") ("[A] board of 
adjustment is an administrative body which may be authorized to exercise quasi-judicial 
powers. . . It is a body without legislative authority.") 
The Utah Legislature has also provided separate statutory provisions for appeals 
from board of adjustment decisions, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708, as distinguishable from a 
city's land use decisions, § 10-9-1001. If the nature of the judicial review were the same in 
both instances, these separate provisions would be redundant. Neither constitutional 
principles nor the rules of statutory construction support such a conclusion. 
There is no question that Utah law applies the "substantial evidence" measure to the 
arbitrary and capricious evaluation of administrative decisions. There is, however, no Utah 
case law which would support application of that standard to a legislative decision by the 
governing body of a municipality. 
In Walker v. Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993) the Supreme Court applied a 
"wholly discordant to reason and justice" measure to the arbitrary and capricious standard 
applied to a legislative decision. Walker at 349 (citations omitted). In Crestview-Holladay 
15 
H f t m w W n m Ass'n v TWh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976), the Supreme Court, 
reviewing a challenge to a rezoning by the Salt Lake County Commission, observed that 
«[i]n the review of zoning cases the function of the court is narrow and its scope is limited 
to a determination of whether or not the action of the Board of County Commissioners as a 
legislative body is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious." Id. at 1151-52. The 
court deferred to the legislative body and found the zoning not to be arbitrary and 
capricious, upholding it as enacted "pursuant to a planning scheme developed for that 
portion of the county." Id. at 1152. Likewise, in Naylor v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 410 P.2d 
764 (Utah 1966), the Supreme Court upheld a rezoning by a city's legislative body. The 
standard it applied in determining whether the action was arbitrary and capricious was 
whether "there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its action must therefore 
be regarded as capricious and arbitrary." Naylor 410 P.2d at 766. 
This Court has recently upheld a city's decision to downzone property, applying a 
"reasonably debatable" standard with deference to the legislative decision maker. Smith 
Investment at 253. Consistent with Utah case law deferring to legislative decision makers, 
the Washington Supreme Court has defined the arbitrary and capricious standard applicable 
to legislative decisions. 
An action is arbitrary or capricious when the legislative body reaches 
its decision "willfully and unreasonably, without consideration and in 
disregard of facts or circumstances." A decision reached after due 
consideration on a matter upon which there is room for differing 
opinions is not arbitrary or capricious. This is so, even though a 
reviewing court may believe the decision is erroneous. 
1 C 
Sparks v. Douglas County. 904 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1995) (citations omitted). Where 
the City has clearly deliberated over alternatives and given careful consideration to differing 
positions, it has not, as a matter of law, acted arbitrarily or capriciously Springville Citizens 
at 337. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT STANDARD OF 
REVIEW, FAILED TO GRANT THE CITY'S DECISIONS THE 
REQUISITE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OR JUDICIAL 
DEFERENCE AND IMPROPERLY SUBS1TTUTED ITS JUDGMENT 
FOR THAT OF THE CITY COUNCIL. 
The errors committed by the trial court are apparent from both Judge Harding's 
introductory comments at the start of the hearing on the parties3 cross-motions for 
summary judgment on January 15, 1999, and from a cursory review of its Memorandum 
Decision. To begin with, Judge Harding incorrectly viewed himself as conducting a plenary 
review which would allow him to make an independent decision based on the facts set forth 
in the legislative record (R. 446, p. 3).4 It is also obvious that the Court relied on the 
wrong standard of review for the City's legislative zoning decision. 
The Court may reverse the City Council's denial of the zone change if 
the "action taken was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and 
capricious." Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 
(Utah 1984). "Even if the reasons given in the motion adopted by the 
council might otherwise be legally sufficient, . . . the denial of a permit 
is arbitrary when the reasons are without sufficient factual basis. . . . 
Citizen opposition is a consideration which must be weighed, but 
cannot be the sole basis for the decision to deny." Davis County v. 
Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704, 711 (Utah Ct App. 1988). The Court 
believes that the standard set forth in Davis County, although that case 
4
 See the Notice by the court reporter that replacement transcripts were filed 
correcting various errors. The trial court record references the original transcript of the 
hearing of January 15, 1999, as being p. 446. 
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involved a denial of an application for a conditional use permit instead 
of a zone change, involves the same legal analysis as this case. 
Memorandum Decision p. 2, R. 342. The trial court incorrectly applied the quasi-judicial 
standard ofXanthos and the administrative standard of Davis County to the City's 
legislative zoning decisions. There is no indication that the court even considered the 
statutory and common law presumptions of validity to which the City's legislative decisions 
were entitled. Noting that the reasons for the City's decisions "might normally be legally 
sufficient," the court concluded that those decisions were "without sufficient factual basis.35 
(R. 342.) 
It appears from the Memorandum Decision that the trial court not only improperly 
made an independent evaluation of the issues by weighing and considering the arguments 
made before the City Council for and against the application to rezone Bradley's property, 
but also erroneously imposed upon the City the burden of demonstrating an adequate 
factual basis in support of its decision in the record. The trial court did not require the 
Bradleys to overcome the presumption of validity afforded the City's decisions or to justify 
setting aside the judicial deference normally afforded a City's legislative actions. This 
redistribution of burdens is legally inappropriate. 
It is equally clear that the trial court engaged in an independent review of the zoning 
maps without consulting the General Plan, improperly substituting its judgment for that of 
the City Council and disagreeing with their conclusions. 
The Court notes that from the zoning maps provided to the Court it 
appears that there are already residentially zoned areas on the west side 
of the 1-15 buffer. The mere fact that Plaintiffs3 property is on the 
west side does not establish that it is contrary to the general plan. 
Memorandum Decision p. 3, R. 341. The trial court failed to acknowledge the references 
in the Payson City General Plan, which were a part of title legislative record, encouraging 
the adoption of an industrial zoning designation west of 1-15 and concentrating such zoning 
in the natural commercial corridor between the Union Pacific and D&RW rail lines and 
between Interstate exits #254 and #252. The plan further encourages residential areas to 
locate east of that natural 1-15 buffer (R. 50, 52). In doing so, the trial court turned its 
back on years of controlling case law to second guess the exercise of legislative discretion by 
the City Council, reversed their decision and imposed the court's own independent 
legislative judgment on this fundamentally political, public policy decision. This was not 
only a deviation from well-established judicial precedent but crossed the line separating the 
judiciary from the legislative branch of government. 
The trial court's excursion, even if unintentional, was nonetheless improper, 
requiring reversal as a matter of law. 
m . THE CITY'S DENIAL OF BRADLEYS' REZONING REQUEST WAS 
NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL. 
A review of the legislative record in this matter, granting the City's exercise of 
legislative discretion the appropriate level of deference and presumption of validity, leads to 
the conclusion that the City's denial of Bradleys' rezoning request was not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal.5 
5
 The trial court's ruling did not address the issue of legality. We therefore confine 
our discussion to whether the City's land use decisions were arbitrary or capricious. 
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A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
CITY'S DENIAL OF BRADLEYS' REZONING REQUEST WAS 
BASED SOLELY ON CITIZEN OPPOSITION BECAUSE THE 
"PUBLIC CLAMOR55 ANALYSIS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS. 
Another fundamental flaw in the trial court's ruling in this case is the conclusion that 
die City acted improperly under the influence of "public clamor." This is another stark 
illustration of a failure to acknowledge the legislative context in which this decision was 
made, as opposed to administrative or quasi-judicial decisions. Such an analysis fails to 
recognize the inherently political and therefore subjective nature of the legislative decision 
making process. By way of illustration, any discussion of whether the proposed rezoning of 
a particular piece of property is "compatible55 with neighboring uses is, by definition, a 
matter of subjective opinion. It is absurd to attempt to apply anything like a "substantial 
evidence55 measure to that legislative process. 
Utah law requires notification of proposed zoning changes and public involvement 
in the process of zoning enactment or amendments. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-402 and 
403. The rights to public notice and participation are judicially enforceable. E.g., Citizen's 
Awareness Now v. Marakis. 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994). 
In pursuing its authority to zone . . . [the zoning body] is performing 
a legislative function. It has the responsibility of advising itself of all 
pertixient facts as a basis for determining what is in the public interest 
in that regard. For this reason it is entirely appropriate to hold public 
hearings and to allow any interested parties it desires to give 
information and to present their ideas on the matter. 
Gayland at 635-36 (footnote omitted). It is appropriate "for the council to consider 
objections of neighbors who would have to live with the proposed use." Heilman v. Citv of 
Roseburg. 591 P.2d 390, 394 (Or. App. 1979). 
Allegations or implications that the City acted improperly under the influence of 
"public clamor" are therefore fundamentally flawed. Cases dealing with public clamor have 
dealt uniformly with administrative denials of permits.6 Even in that context, the courts 
also find objection only where the record demonstrates that public clamor is the sole basis 
for the denial of a permit. 
Consideration of citizen views is clearly appropriate in the formulation of policy 
decisions, including requests to rezone individual parcels of property. Given the legal 
requirement that the Council involve the public in its evaluation of a zoning change, it 
would be illogical to argue that the Council should receive public comment but not base its 
decision on any of the opinions expressed or input received. 
One of the realities which the "public clamor" argument ignores is that elected 
officials are expected to protect the interests of their constituencies in making legislative 
policy decisions. Of necessity, this involves a balancing of the interests of all property 
owners, not just those of the property owner who seeks a rezoning. In order to engage in 
6
 Davis County v. Clearfield City (denial of a conditional use permit); C.R.P. 
Inv.. Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 1981) (denial of a special use 
permit for "quad housing55); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc., 652 
P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1982) (denial of permit for operation of youth services facility); City of 
Barnum v. County of Carlton. 386 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. App. 1986) (denial of conditional 
use permit); Chanhassen Estates Residence Assoc, v. Chankasseq 342 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 
1984) (denial of conditional use permit). 
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that balancing, all legislative bodies, not just city councils, must listen to public opinion and 
decide how much weight to give to the opinions expressed. 
The record demonstrates that the Council appropriately considered public comment 
and carefully balanced the interests of the general public and Bradleys. There is no 
evidence that the decision "was based solely on citizen opposition." (R. 341.) In fact, there 
is no evidence that the public input amounted to public clamor. Considering that public 
input as part of the Councirs legislative deliberation of the zoning request was not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal. 
B. THE EXISTENCE OF EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WHICH 
MIGHT ALSO SUPPORT AN ALTERNATIVE CONCLUSION 
DOES NOT MAKE THE CITY'S DECISION ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL. 
It is important to keep in mind while reviewing the legislative record in this case that 
merely because die information presented to the council, as reflected by that record, mav 
have also justified a reasonable alternative conclusion, that does not render the decision 
made by the City arbitrary, capricious or illegal or justify the trial court's substitution of its 
judgment for that of local legislative decision makers. Sandy City at 482; Gayland at 636. 
Nor is it determinative that the Planning Commission initially recommended 
approval of the Peterson rezoning request.7 A favorable finding and recommendation by 
7
 We note that the record also does not support the trial court's conclusion that 
"The Planning Commission initially recommended approving the application and then 
changed its mind after the public hearing on March 20, 1996." (R. 342.) In fact, it was 
merely the Planning Staff Report which recommended approval. The Commission 
recommended denial, but did not change its mind. This circumstance clearly does not 
evidence public clamor." 
the planning commission need not be followed by the council. See 4 Anderson § 23.28 at 
231 (". . . the recommendation of the planning board does not bind the legislative 
authority, and . . . such recommendation is advisory only."); 3 Rathkopfs § 30.03 at 30-11 
("Even though it is necessary for the legislative body to refer proposals to the planning 
commission and to receive the recommendations of that body, it is generally held that the 
recommendations of the commission need not be followed.55 (citing 19 cases from various 
jurisdictions)). 
There is no authority for the proposition that the council must defer to 
the commission's recommendation to approve a zone change. . . . The 
council has the responsibility to make the 2:oning decision based upon 
its own valid findings. It is not bound by the commission's findings 
even if they are supported by substantial evidence. 
Heilman at 392 (emphasis added). 
The Municipal Land Use Act does not require the council to follow the planning 
commission's recommendation. E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403 (requiring only 
submission to planning commission for recommendation). If it did, the council's 
deliberation and all of its public hearings on zoning matters would be meaningless. The 
planning commission has no statutory authority to zone property; only the City's legislative 
body has that authority. The appointed commission recommends; the elected council as the 
governing body legislates. In exercising its zoning authority, the council is not bound by 
the recommendations of the commission and does not act arbitrarily or capriciously in not 
following those recommendations. Whatever the original or subsequent recommendations 
of the Planning Commission, its recommendations are not determinative as to whether the 
final legislative decision was arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
As with a determination of whether a use is compatible with adjoining properties, 
the decision of whether a requested zoning change is consistent with the general plan is an 
inherently subjective determination. While it is true that a different conclusion could also 
have been reached, as was done by the trial court, that does not make the original 
conclusion arbitrary or capricious. Where the conclusion is "reasonably debatable," Utah 
law requires the trial court to defer to and uphold the legislative judgment of the City 
Council. Its failure to do so here is erroneous as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The appropriate measure of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard as applied to a 
legislative decision on an application for rezoning requires broad judicial deference in 
recognition of the separation of powers doctrine. The measure of "substantial evidence" 
which applies to administrative decisions does not accommodate the requisite deference and 
invites the Court to substitute its judgment for that of local legislators. The Court should 
decline the invitation to reject years of well-settled, well-reasoned law to impose a new and 
more restrictive standard on legislative zoning decisions. 
In this case, the exercise of legislative discretion by the City Council in denying the 
Bradley application for rezoning necessarily involves a subjective determination of what is in 
the best interest of the residents of the City based on an evaluation of the long-term goal 
and policy of the General Plan to promote industrial uses in this area and reflects the 
fundamentally political nature of making public policy choices in enacting and modifying 
land use goals and ordinances, a quintessentially legislative process. Under these 
circumstances, consistent with existing law, the Court must defer to the legislative discretion 
of the City Council. 
Applying the correct deferential standard to the record before the Court leads to the 
conclusion that the City did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner in denying 
Bradleys5 rezoning request The ruling of the trial court is therefore incorrect as a matter of 
law and should be reversed. 
DATED this of October, 1999. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By. 
Jody K 
AxxomM for Defendants/Appellant 
PaysorrCity Corporation 
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ADDENDUM A-1 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
^
f t l ? ^ . / i / i .Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BRADLEY, ET AL., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PAYSON CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 970400264 
DATE: January 21, 1999 
JUDGE: RAY M HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: DaveBackman 
This matter came before the Court upon Plaintiffs' and Defendant's cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment. Having received and considered the Motions, together with memoranda in 
support of and opposition to the Motions, the Court hereby grants Plaintiffs' Motion, denies 
Defendant's Motion, and delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiffs applied to Payson City to change the zone of their property from R-l-A to R-
2-75. Upon initial review of the application, the Planning Commission Staff issued an interoflBce 
memo to the Mayor and the City Council members recommending approval of the zone change 
and for the Planning Commission and the City Council to hold a joint public hearing on the 
matter. On March 20, 1996, a joint public hearing was held and several landowners in the area 
expressed their opinions concerning the proposed change. After the public hearing, the Planning 
Commission voted to recommend denial of the zone change based on the opinions expressed at 
the public hearing. The City Council then voted to deny the change based on: (1) how it would 
be contrary to the General Plan; (2) traffic concerns relating to the industrial park; and (3) the 
Planning Commission's recommendation. 
0343 
Opinion of the Court 
Summary judgment is proper only if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact 
ahd the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." URCP 56(c). The Court must 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
The Court may reverse the City Council's denial of the zone change if the "action taken 
was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious." Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment. 685 
P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). "Even if the reasons given in the motion adopted by the council 
might otherwise be legally sufficient, . . . the denial of a permit is arbitrary when the reasons are 
without sufficient factual basis.. . . Citizen opposition is a consideration which must be weighed, 
but cannot be the sole basis for the decision to deny." Davis County v. Clearfield CityT 756 P.2d 
704, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Court believes that the standard set forth in Davis County, 
although that case involved a denial of an application for a conditional use permit instead of a 
zone change, involves the same legal analysis as this case. 
The Court finds that the City Council's decision to deny Plaintiffs' first application was 
arbitrary and capricious. The City Council stated that it based its decision on: (1) how the zone 
change would be contrary to the General Plan; (2) traffic concerns relating to the industrial park; 
and (3) the Planning Commission's recommendation. The stated reasons might normally be 
legally sufficient. However, they are without sufficient factual basis. The traffic concern was not 
a sufficient reason for the denial since there was no evidence before the City Council that the 
proposed zone change would in fact create traffic concerns. Also, there was no factual basis to 
rely on the Planning Commission's recommendation. The Planning Commission initially 
recommended approving the application and then changed its mind after the public hearing on 
March 20, 1996. The only reasons the Commission gave for its sudden reversal were the 
comments the neighbors made at the public hearing. Accordingly, the City Council's reliance on 
the Commission's recommendation was factually unfounded. Similarly, neither the Planning 
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Commission nor the City Council provided any factual basis for the reason that the zone change 
would be contrary to the General Plan. The Court notes that from the zoning maps provided to 
the Court it appears that there are already residentially zoned areas on the west side of the 1-15 
buffer. The mere fact that Plaintiffs' property is on the west side does not establish that it is 
contrary to the General Plan. 
There being no sufficient factual basis for the decision to deny Plaintiffs' application, the 
Court finds that the decision was based solely on citizen opposition and was therefore arbitrary 
and capricious. Having reversed the denial of the application for a zone change from R-l-A to 
R-2-75, the Court need not analyze the denial of the second application. 
Order 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The zone change 
from R-l-A to R-2-75 is hereby approved. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
DATED this day of January, 1999. 
cc: Mark E. Arnold, Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Diana L. Garrett, Attorney for Plaintiffs 
David C. Tuckett, Attorney for Payson City 
David L. Church, Attorney for Payson City 
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ADDENDUM A-2 
Mark E. Arnold, Bar No. 3758 
Diana L. Garrett, Bar No. 7206 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4333 
Fax: (801)328-4351 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BRADLEY, JOYCE BRADLEY, 
R. DALE WHITELOCK, 
KARMA WHITELOCK, LOUIS PETERSON, ) 
AND BARBARA PETERSON, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. 
Payson City Corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) Case No. 970400264 
1 Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr. 
ORDER 
On January 15, 1999, came on for hearing Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at which Mark E. Arnold and Diana L. Garrett, of 
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C, appeared in behalf of the Plaintiffs and David C. Tuckett appeared in 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, Stat* of Utah 
CARMA %ySM»TM, Clark 
behalf of Defendant, Payson City Corporation. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the Court 
took the matter under advisement. 
The Court, after having reviewed the Motions and supporting Memoranda and documents 
submitted by the parties, as well as the record, and after having fully considered the same, issued 
its Memorandum Decision on January 21, 1999. 
The Court, pursuant to its Memorandum Decision, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and 
DECREES that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, so that Plaintiffs property 
is changed from R-l-A to R-2-75 zoning, and that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
Ra>)$kHarding, Sr. 
Fourth District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
David C. Tuckett 
Attorney for Defendant Payson City Corporation 
2 
